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In a world that had largely adopted a Deweyan sense of itself, Body Consciousness
would not have to be written. In such a world, it would be taken for granted that
philosophy should account for sensory experience as much as for cognitive experience, that there are no minds apart from the bodies that support them, and that
conscious reflection on the health and well-being of those bodies is a necessary element of any journey to enlightenment or happiness. However, we do not yet live
in such a world, at least not we philosophers, who continue to write as if thinking
can be thought about in isolation from the physical environment, that intelligence
is a purely mental quality, and that focusing on the body is both narcissistic and
unrelated to moral growth. Contemporary culture reflects this lack of understanding in its fixation on idealized images of the external body, its increasing reliance
on pain-killers and other symptom-alleviating drugs (both legal and illegal), and
its failure to adequately overcome social and racial inequalities and stereotypes
often associated with bodies that are different from a norm. For a Deweyan philosopher, the underlying presumptions of these cultural failings are preposterous,
given Dewey’s lifelong attempt to describe experience as situated and transactional,
body-mind as a continuous whole, and freedom as the result of a willingness to
incorporate the physical environment into intelligent action.
Richard Shusterman is most definitely a Deweyan, having developed his
own flavor of Deweyan pragmatism in previous essays and books—most clearly
in his 1997 Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life—and this
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book reflects that orientation throughout, leading to a wholeheartedly Deweyan
consummation in a chapter entitled “Redeeming Somatic Reflection: John Dewey’s Philosophy of Body-Mind.” This consummation comes, however, only after
a thorough examination of ideas about the role of the body in the works of Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Wittgenstein, and William James, in
each case showing how those ideas—while an improvement on the classical mindbody dualisms of Plato, Descartes, and Kant—are still limited in terms of either
philosophical theory, ideas about everyday living, or the practical means of incorporating “body consciousness” into healthy living. For this book seeks not only
to overcome traditional dualisms about mind and body, questioning philosophy’s
longstanding reluctance to take full account of the role of the body in lived experience, but also to overcome the tendency of philosophy to distance itself from embodied practices, such as meditation, yoga, and the Alexander/Feldenkrais methods of somatic education, as well as from the “merely” empirical sciences and such
seemingly nonphilosophical everyday activities as sex, eating, and exercise. What
Shusterman seeks, and what he eventually suggests that Dewey has come closest to
providing, is a comprehensive understanding of experience, incorporating thought,
word, deed, and even spirit.
I found myself both engrossed with and intrigued by this book throughout. It is lucidly written for a general educated audience, assuming little specific
knowledge of the philosophers it treats, but moves quickly beyond reiteration,
not distracted by irrelevant details, as it continually builds toward its Deweyan
conclusions. It includes numerous helpful footnotes that provide guidance to
those who wish to explore Shusterman’s more controversial claims in further
detail. I especially liked the way that Shusterman weaves contemporary issues
such as commercialism, the proper role of technology, policies towards people
with disabilities, and attitudes towards difference into his narrative. Perhaps the
only meaningful criticism I can make of the book is that, for a reader with a solid
understanding of Dewey’s work (that is, well beyond his explicitly educational
writings), the book sometimes tantalizingly withholds the obvious Deweyan implications of a particular dialectical line of thinking until the last chapter or hints
at them in a footnote referencing Dewey. Such readers will see through some of
Shusterman’s more obvious rhetorical ploys—not so often as to frustrate, but certainly enough to leave a knowing smile of anticipation. I think this demonstrates
that Shusterman is not just preaching to the choir here: he wants to effect some
conversions as well. Convicted Deweyans will have to tolerate these moments
for the sake of Shusterman’s greater ambitions.
Somaesthetics, which Shusterman first introduced in Practicing Philosophy, is
a disciplinary framework that critically examines the relationship between the soma,
or “living, feeling, sentient body” (p. 1), and philosophical thought, while seeking
to change the ways that we think about ourselves and live our lives. Somaesthetics
includes three branches: “The analytic study of the body’s role in perception, experience, and action and thus in our mental, moral, and social life; the pragmatic
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study of methodologies to improve our body-mind functioning and thus expand
our capacities of self-fashioning; and the practical branch that investigates such
pragmatic methods by testing them on our own flesh in concrete experience and
practice” (p. 139). Essential to the successful pursuit of the discipline, then, is not
only a willingness to acknowledge the role of the body in our entire lives, but also
a willingness to use our own bodies to explore and understand that role and how
certain experiences can shape ourselves and our culture.
Somaesthetics unconditionally accepts that our bodies represent the core
of our being and identity, forming “our primary perspective or mode of engagement with the world, determining (often unconsciously) our choice of ends and
means by structuring the very needs, habits, interests, pleasures, and capacities
on which those ends and means rely for their significance” (pp. 2-3), thus inexorably affecting our thinking and our culture. Thus, we both have bodies and are
bodies; everything we feel and do is mediated by and through our bodies. If,
Shusterman argues, we fail to adequately understand the sheer physicality of
ourselves and others—if we think about thinking without acknowledging that
all thinking takes place within organic living brains that cannot in any sense be
separated from our bodies or from the physical environment in which we live,
breathe, and experience—then we will establish both moral ideals and cultural
practices that lead inevitably to moral and physical disease and social discord.
Avoiding such consequences requires “body consciousness.”
One interesting aspect of the book is that it doesn’t follow a chronological
path. Rather than showing how Dewey represents the culmination of a steady improvement of thought through the generations, with each philosopher incorporating
the insights of his or her forebears, Shusterman starts in the recent past with Foucault, and proceeds from there backwards in time to Merleau-Ponty, then Simone
de Beauvoir, then Wittgenstein, and then William James. It’s as if he is trying to
show where contemporary philosophy went awry in its trajectory, locating significant errors in recent thinking, and then digging further back to find the source
of those errors, looking for something less off the track. Thus, Foucault, writes
Shusterman, shows a far greater willingness than many of his peers to explore the
relationship between thought and body—especially the body’s physical pleasure
or pain—and to see the body as “an especially vital site for self-knowledge and
self-transformation” (p. 9), but gets trapped in a crippling obsession with deviant
practices such as sadomasochistic sex and the use of drugs. Seeking the origins
of this distraction, Shusterman traces the roots of Foucault’s thought in the ideas
of Merleau-Ponty, who, while seeing the physical body as the source of all spontaneity and truth, places conscious reflection about the body into a forbidden zone,
lest such consciousness allow small-minded logic to smother the body’s truth.
Even Simon de Beauvoir, who worked to bring the experience of philosophically
neglected women and elderly people into philosophy’s purview and wrote extensively about the objectification of the body in Western culture, was trapped in the
view that working directly on one’s own body was inevitably to feed forms of social
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oppression. Merleau-Ponty’s and Beauvoir’s errors, says Shusterman, can be traced
in part to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein did more than any other twentieth-century
philosopher to dispel certain unconscious assumptions about the relationship between mind and body, many contained in our linguistic inheritances. Wittgenstein
offers a key insight in showing that human thought and action—rather than originating solely in the mind or completely in the organic systems of the body—reflect
the entire context in which they take place, including the physical environment as
well as social norms, ideals, and common practices. While he briefly touches on
the ways that better consciousness of emotions and feelings in relation to that extended context can be utilized for both moral and aesthetic self-improvement and
for political progress, Wittgenstein fails to adequately develop the implications
of his insights, especially the possibility of adjusting people’s visceral reactions to
others of different ethnic backgrounds through a form of mindfulness training. In
short, while Wittgenstein comes very close to an understanding of the role of the
body in thought and culture, his work stops short of the pragmatic implications of
such theory that Shusterman wants to include in his somaesthetics. In pursuit of
such implications, Shusterman goes back further to a thinker who catalyzed many
of Wittgenstein’s ideas: William James.
In James, Shusterman finds some of the original conceptions that he seeks.
James, more than anyone who came before and many of those who came after, developed a comprehensive understanding of the continuity of mental and physical
experience, failing only in the specific recommendations he made for cultivating
the body—an error Shusterman attributes to James’s own physical ailments and the
New England culture in which he lived—and in an inadequate conception of the
relation of body and mind to the will. James understood the essentially continuous
organic nature of mind and body to a degree that many of his twentieth-century
followers did not. Quoting James’s “The Experience of Activity,” Shusterman writes,
“The body . . . is the storm centre, the origin of coordinates, the constant place of
stress in [our] experience-train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point
of view” (p. 135). James’s clarity on the body is due in part to his early training in
anatomy and physiology and his knowledge of the emergent field of experimental
psychology. This foundation gave James a unique perspective that allowed him to
bridge disciplinary boundaries (boundaries which, by the way, have gotten deeper
and wider in the intervening years; this perhaps accounting for why contemporary
philosophers have proven unable to build successfully on James’s comprehensive
understanding). Shusterman spends a good deal of effort discussing both the
strengths and limitations of James’s account of the body, with special attention to
the ways that James’s life experiences relate to the ways that he developed his ideas.
The details of James’s biographical and autobiographical stories give Shusterman an
opportunity to discuss more fully the pragmatic and practical sides of somaesthetics in a way that will likely resonate with his scholarly readers, many of whom, like
James, may be afflicted with imperfect “uses” of their bodies, perhaps exacerbated
by too much attention given to the life of the mind (or to their computers).
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Shusterman devotes considerable attention to James’s systematic treatment
of the role of habit in human experience. Habits, for James, are the building blocks
of both individuality and of culture, representing the organic embodiment of attitudes, values, knowledge, skills, and ideals, and blessing humanity with both the
transformative possibilities of successful education and the frustratingly difficult
task of social improvement. Shusterman doesn’t simply reiterate James’s insights
on habit, but shows how they are reaffirmed to a large extent by the findings of
contemporary neurology, most explicitly in the work of Antonio Damasio. Habits operate continuously, usually unconsciously, providing a background of selfidentity and performative automaticity that makes human consciousness, willful
attention, and sustained reasoning possible.
The final chapter of Body Consciousness further explores the importance of
habit through examination of the work of Dewey, who found his entire conception of the human self fundamentally transformed by reading James’s Principles of
Psychology, and who, more than James, completely accepted nondualistic naturalism, not only in biology, but in psychology, aesthetics, and even religion. Indeed,
Dewey invented the term “body-mind” (or “mind-body”) to express the oneness
of the self and to avoid falling into old habits when discussing their relationships.
This naturalist conception infuses Dewey’s middle and later works, most explicitly in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), which explores in detail the ways that
habit interacts with native impulses and intelligence, and the important implications of these interactions for human and social development. Dewey also incorporates insights he gained from his personal experience of relearning how to use
his own body from F. M. Alexander and his brother, A. R. The Alexander method
was essential in cementing Dewey’s theoretical views into a coherent world view.
Most importantly, Alexander helped Dewey to see that the refusal to allow a habit
to kick in—what Alexander referred to as “inhibition”—is a key to understanding
the mechanisms of free will without falling into dualistic thinking, as James had.
For Dewey, there is no opposition between habit and thought or will; rather, the
important distinction is between unintelligent or routine habit, and intelligent or
reflective habit. Self-fulfillment for Dewey is a matter of employing intelligent, or
artistic, habits to gradually modify the “bundle of ‘complex, unstable, opposing
attitudes, habits, impulses’ we call the self” (p. 205; quoting Dewey, MW 14:96), in
a direction that is compatible with desired ends-in-view. The self constitutes what
Shusterman says is a “multifaceted, complexly integrated, dynamic field rather than
a simple, static, linear system” (p. 208), and successful living requires conscious
appreciation for, selective attention to, and painstaking amelioration of the self’s
pluralistic elements in all their dimensions.
Recall that somaesthetics involves both pragmatic and practical aspects as
well as analytical ones. It therefore cannot be confined, as much of philosophy has
been, to mere theory. Nor can it be constrained to widely accepted social practices.
Thus, Shusterman applauds Foucault for his transgressive assault on contemporary
sexual practices as well as James for his experiments in various methods of personal
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improvement, including “moral holidays,” wearing corsets, electric shocks, spinal
vibration, marijuana, and mescaline. While Shusterman himself doesn’t claim to
participate in these forms of investigation (although he explicitly refers throughout the book to his own training in Zen Buddhism and the Feldenkrais method,
and often uses examples that implicitly reveal some of his own experiences of
sex), he does suggest that the successful somaesthetician—indeed, the successful
human—will examine both personal habits and social norms, regarding them as
fundamentally tentative.
Dewey’s experiences with the Alexander method as well as Shusterman’s
own experiences suggest that efforts at self-improvement often require the guidance of trained teachers and wise others, who can help us to see ourselves in new
and more comprehensive ways. For we must understand our bodies not only from
the inside, but must gain appreciation for how they look from the outside and for
how their actions and inactions affect and are affected by the environment. An
expanded notion of self that includes not only the mind and body, but the entire
social and physical context in which they exist, leads Shusterman to an essentially
spiritual conclusion: “This relational symbiotic notion of the self inspires a more
extensive notion of somatic meliorism in which we are also charged with caring
for and harmonizing the environmental affordances of our embodied selves, not
just our own body parts” (p. 215). He continues, “By enabling us to feel more of
our universe with greater acuity, awareness, and appreciation, such a vision of
somaesthetic cultivation promises the richest and deepest palate of experiential
fulfillments because it can draw on the profusion of cosmic resources, including
an uplifting sense of cosmic unity” (p. 216). That sense of unity, which motivated
Dewey and motivates many of us, can provide us and our communities with enhanced meaning, direction, and purpose. This, Shusterman claims, is ultimately
why we should pay attention to the life of our bodies as well as our minds.
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